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Abstract
Discussions around health sector reforms in developing countries have included the issue of user fees as a
possible mechanism for cost recovery as well as a technique for improving allocative efficiency. The main
argument against user fees is based on the possible regressive impact on utilisation of health services. This
debate can be meaningfully analysed in terms of the welfare implications of user fees, using a framework of
utility maximisation and estimating demand functions for health care. The study uses the 1994–95 NCAER-
HDI data on rural India to explore the possible effects of an increase in user fees on demand for health care.
A system of equations using both nested and non-nested multinomial logit framework was estimated, and
arc price elasticities were calculated. The estimates revealed very low values of these elasticities in the
government sector as well as for private qualified providers. Also, the elasticities were income-sensitive,
indicating that the poor are more price-sensitive; and that there may be some scope to levy user fees in the
government as well as private sector facilities. However, since these results could be due to the limited
choice available to consumers, the increase in user fees will have to be accompanied by a real improvement
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1. INTRODUCTION
The demand for health care in most developing countries has been visualised as a basic right for
the individual. This perception has over the years manifested itself through the emergence of
extensive publicly supported health care systems with unlimited access at zero or little cost to
the user. The resource crunch and the necessity for adopting structural adjustment programmes
which was perceived by most countries during the 1980s, led to a rethinking on the concepts of
demand, utilisation and cost recovery in the context of health care services.
The arguments in favour of government provision for health services are many and well
known.  The deviations observed in the existing health systems from the market system have
generally been justified by claiming that health goods present peculiar features rendering them
different from other goods. The public goods aspect of health services, presence of significant
externalities, increasing returns to scale, along with uncertainty and asymmetric information in the
market for health goods and services result in market failure and therefore a sub-optimal level of
provision of these services. Arguments of equity and merit goods are added on to further justify
public provision of health goods and services.
It is important to recognise that health goods are not homogeneous in nature and
therefore it is possible that the market may present a suitable form of allocation in one instance
but may fail in another. More importantly, market failure does not necessarily mean that the
alternative is public provision; theory does not offer any insights into whether when markets fail,
the public sector is the second best alternative. It is entirely possible to ensure a mechanism by
which markets are made more efficient by removing some of the causes of market failure.  The
least justification for public provision of services occurs in the case of curative care, which does
not generally exhibit properties of collective or public goods, or externalities.  For this, one has
to resort to arguments of merit goods and equity alone, and not efficiency.  The 1993 World
Development Report (WDR) of the World Bank mentions the necessity of providing cost-
effective health services to the poor, where health is viewed as a basic human right and can
contribute towards alleviating poverty.  Where private markets could fail to provide adequate
access8
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 to essential clinical services or insurance cover for the poor, public provision and finance of
such health care is justifiable easily on humanitarian grounds.  Access to free or low-cost care
can produce large increases in the poorer sections’ consumption of health care in situations
where the poor are more sensitive to the price of medical care and, suffer from a greater burden
of disease than the non-poor.  However, the WDR emphasises that services, which fall beyond
the scope of public health and the essential clinical package, should by default be treated as
normal goods, and can be provided by the market.
Evidence from  most developing countries at least indicates the inefficiencies of the
prevailing government health systems which have disillusioned many of the targeted users;
provision of free care of all kinds to all the citizens has in reality resulted in rationing of services
either in terms of physical quantities or in terms of quality.  Studies exist to show that people
spend large amounts out-of-pocket for curative care, by preferring to visit private, rather than
public health facilities (Sundar, 1995; Visaria et al., 1994). The deteriorating quality of publicly
provided services combined with the sheer bankruptcy faced by governments and the public
health care delivery system, brought into sharp focus the need to reconsider the whole approach
to the provision of health services as well as to give serious thought to cost recovery measures,
which were now seen as necessary from both allocative efficiency and revenue-raising angles.
The main argument against user fees is based on the possible regressive nature of such
fees in so far as it can affect the utilisation of health services by the poorer and needier sections.
This argument presupposes that the poor are more price sensitive than the rich are; alternatively,
in terms of demand elasticities, their demands are located on the elastic segment of the
community’s demand curve for health services.
The entire debate can be meaningfully analysed in terms of the welfare implications of
financing health care services.  User fees, non-monetary costs such as travel time, the spatial
distribution of services, and many other socio-economic features have found a place in the
literature on the welfare analysis of health financing.  The starting point of a welfare analysis is an
estimation of the demand for health care.  This study proposes to conduct such an exercise
using data collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research, Delhi, in order to
be able to throw up relevant policy implications for the Indian health financing scenario.  Section
2 presents a brief summary of the theory of demand for health care; Section 3 discusses the10
modelling and data in the context of India; Section 4 presents the analysis and results and,
finally, the summary and conclusions of the study are presented in Section 5.11
2.  DEMAND FOR HEALTH SERVICES: ISSUES, PERSPECTIVES AND
METHODOLOGY
2.1 Overview
The central issue in the user-fee controversy has been whether sufficient revenues can be
generated from patients, and what consequences user fees would have on the distribution of
health care. Estimating the household demand for health services can establish the trade-off
between cost recovery and consequences for health care utilisation, and in setting public prices
for government provided medical services. Further, the debate on whether the government
should restrict itself to preventive and promotive care and let the private sector take charge of
curative care can be analysed only with regard to the welfare effects of such policies.  Policy
proposals by economists to fund health care in developing countries have made the empirical
demand estimation of price elasticities a key empirical input in their analyses of effects of user
fees on different socio-economic categories in the population, primarily across various income
classes, age-groups and gender.
The demand for treatment in response to a particular episode of illness or injury can be
modelled in terms of the provider choice between opting for different kinds of care; for example
the choice can be among public, private and no care.  Primarily such an analysis is more relevant
for the case of curative care. Empirical specification for such a model starts from a behavioural
model of utility maximisation, where utility depends on health and the consumption of other
goods, besides medical care.  On experiencing an illness, an individual is hypothesised to
choose among various treatment alternatives (including the no treatment alternative) so as to
maximise total utility subject to his/her budget constraint.  In the 1980s several attempts to
estimate demand for health care took place under the Living Standards Measurement Survey
(LSMS) series of the World Bank, for many countries of the developing world.  The utility
derived by an individual from an increase in his/her health status was modelled as a function of
the options available to the individual and a vector of individual characteristics.  This body of
work brought into focus the role played by several different factors in determining the efficacy of
medical care, or its potential impact. These factors included the impact of both monetary outlays12
and non-monetary costs such as travel time and waiting time in accessing health facilities, which
were seen as defining the quality of a particular facility or provider option.
Initial attempts at modelling demand for health had used a multinomial logit (MNL)
framework for modelling demand functions.  The MNL model assumes that the stochastic
portions of the conditional utility functions are uncorrelated across alternatives. McFadden
(1981) shows that, given a reasonable distributional assumption on the behaviour of the
disturbance term, these demand functions take on a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) form,
where it is first decided whether to seek care or not, and then conditional on seeking care
deciding from which provider to seek care. The NMNL is more general than the more
commonly used multinomial logit (MNL) specification, which assumes that the decision to seek
care between any two alternatives does not depend upon the characteristics of any other
available alternative. This is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which
says that the conditional utility functions are uncorrelated across alternatives, and that cross-
price elasticities are the same across alternatives.   Allowing for the interplay of price and
income effects in the specification of the utility function was also a significant improvement in the
conventional literature on the subject.
Most of the earlier studies typically model demand as a discrete choice with the price
effect specified to be independent of income. They find prices to have little impact on demand
for medical care. Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987) show that these models are inconsistent
with utility maximisation, when health is treated as a normal good, and derive a discrete-choice
specification from a theoretical model where income can affect the choice of provider. This
specification holds true only if the conditional utility function allows for a non-constant marginal
rate of substitution (Gertler and van der Gaag, 1990), such as a semi-quadratic utility function
which is linear in health and quadratic in consumption.
Most third world applications of demand analysis have reached the conclusion that
aggregate consumer welfare would be reduced with the imposition of user fees, with the burden
of the loss being borne by the poor, although such fees would be useful in generating revenues.
Issues such as the distribution of resulting revenues through schemes that would be targeted
towards the underprivileged, for example, by introducing user fee schedules that increase with13
ability to pay, have been continuously debated in the literature.  We present below some
relevant findings that emerge from a few of the numerous studies on demand for health care in
less developing countries.
2.2 Experiments in Demand Modelling: Applications to LDCs
The objectives of estimating the model for provider choice in health care and finding the price
elasticities of demand can be listed as: (a) to investigate the implications for cost recovery (i.e.
financing of health care), (b) to find the levels of utilisation under different methods of financing
and (c) to find the welfare consequences of various user fees policies. The demand functions
can be estimated from household survey data, provided there is sufficient variation in prices. But
most of the government financed health care systems are characterised by prices, which are
zero or much below marginal costs. The interpretation of prices in a broader sense, i.e. as the
cost of obtaining medical care which, along with the fee paid to the doctor, also includes the
opportunity cost of time spent in travelling and queuing at the hospital or clinic, can facilitate the
estimation of the demand relationship. Thus, variations in individuals’ costs of obtaining medical
care enables estimation of price responses even when money prices are zero. These responses
allow for calculation of the welfare consequences. Observations on current patterns of
consumption of medical care can be used to quantify the effect of such variables as income,
price (including for example travel time), education and family size, among other things. These
demand equations can be used to calculate price elasticities that show how price sensitive
consumers are and how price sensitivity differs among consumer groups.  Complications in
modelling the demand for health care arise because existing prices show little variation across
regions, and are usually zero for government provided services.  Also, people take discrete
decisions regarding health care utilisation unlike normal commodities, which are provided on an
almost continuous scale, making the distributional assumptions of the models critical.
The decision to choose between different health care providers involves evaluating the
cost and quality of care in each of the options available. It has been observed that higher-priced
options, such as treatment in the private sector, are usually associated with a higher quality of
health care. Thus, not controlling for variations in the quality of care means that the parameter14
estimates of the coefficients on prices would be biased, and these would not represent the actual
price effects on the choice of the health care provider. Studies, which take into account the
effect of quality on decision-making typically, treat quality of care as an unobservable and
designate different options of health care as different levels of the quality of care (Ellis and
Mwabu 1991, Lavy & Quigley 1991, Gertler & van der Gaag 1990, Alderman & Gertler
1989). Lavy & Germain (1995), on the other hand, explicitly measure the sensitivity of
consumer demand to various quality characteristics of provider choices taking a general
conditional utility function that is stable with consistent utility maximisation, and empirically model
the effect of quality of health care on household decision-making (see for example Mwabu,
Ainsworth & Nyamete 1993).  They estimate the model using a nested multinomial logit model
(NMNL), using individual and community-level data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey.
The quality characteristics of various health care providers were grouped under five broad
categories -- drug availability, number of medical staff, infrastructure, immunisation & other
services and the presence or absence of an operating room. The individual level price factors
were grouped into distance to the facility chosen, measured in terms of travel costs, and the fees
charged for consultations; and individual characteristics by age, gender, years of schooling and
whether the head of the household was educated or not. Using the estimated model, they
simulate the impact of improving various quality variables  (like drug availability, presence of a
qualified doctor, reducing the distance, i.e. improving accessibility etc.) and increasing or
decreasing user fees in the public sector.
The discrete-choice model allows for estimation of willingness to pay (WTP) to vary
with income levels, which enables measurement of the distributional consequences of improving
both access and quality parameters.  Lavy, Palumbo & Stern (1995) in their study on quality of
health care outcomes in Jamaica use the parameter estimates of the determinants of the choice
of health care facilities to construct a measure of the quality of health care available to each
person, and use it to investigate the effect on labour-force participation rates in a simultaneous-
equation probit model. They thus link the availability, quality and utilisation of health care to
market returns, providing an alternative to the established methodology in terms of evaluating the
cost effectiveness of health policies that impact on adult morbidity in developing countries.15
Gertler and van der Gaag (1988) provided a methodology for the ex-ante evaluation of
the welfare effects of proposals to use user fees to finance improved access to social services.
Their analysis was based on the estimation of willingness to pay for improved access to medical
services where willingness to pay is the maximum price that can be charged without reducing the
individual’s welfare.  An important offshoot of their analysis was the demonstration of how
variation in individuals’ (private) time prices could be used to identify the parameters of the
demand function.  This is of special relevance in the context of LDCs where the public sector
provides medical services at little or zero price to the consumer, making it difficult to
meaningfully estimate the demand function.  Using data from Cote d’ Ivoire, their model yields
results similar to the case of Peru.
A study on low income households in Ghana (Lavy & Quigley, 1993) came to the
conclusion that household income is an important determinant of the demand for the quality and
intensity of medical care sought in response to an illness or injury.  The price of medical care is a
less important factor. Of more relevance to the typical LDC situation is the confirmation of the
hypotheses that it is the availability and accessibility of treatment choices which is much more
important than prices in determining decisions about medical care.
A more recent work on Bolivia (Masako Ii, 1996) examines the determinants of
demand for medical services in urban areas of Bolivia.  Exploring the trade-offs between cost
recovery and the use of health services for different age, sex, ethnic and income groups, the
paper puts forward the argument that the low price elasticities of demand could be used as a
lever to raise revenues by charging user fees, although the demand for outpatient medical care is
found to be price elastic with its subsequent adverse welfare implications for the lower income
groups.
Dow’s study (1996) estimates both conditional and unconditional demand elasticities for
the case of Cote d’ Ivoire.  Elaborating on the consistency of datasets, he advocates that
conditional estimates can be interpreted only as short-run effects while to capture the long-run
impacts of policy implications, it is more appropriate to compute unconditional demand
elasticities which focus attention on the health needs of both healthy and sick people.  These and16
other methodology-based arguments are discussed in greater detail below, while modelling the
most appropriate demand functions for the Indian scenario.
3.  MODELLING DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE IN INDIA:
ISSUES AND DATA
3.1 Overview
In India one finds an array of health care providers, who are accessed by people from varied
socio-economic categories.  At one end of the spectrum there is a large informal sector,
comprising providers such as faith healers, or religious healers, who dispense certain forms of
indigenous medicines.  The non-allopathic streams such as homeopathic and ayurvedic medicine
are also extremely popular, and in fact often find a place within the formal set-up such as
government organisations.  At the other extreme are the qualified allopathic providers,
dispensing (allopathic) health services in both the government and the private sector, constituting
the formal sector.  It is also important to remember that in between the indigenous practitioner
and the qualified doctor, there exists a whole range of semi-trained or unqualified personnel
such as paramedics and pharmacists for meeting the people’s health care needs.
Compared to other countries of the region, India spends a relatively high percentage of
its GDP on health care.   About 70 percent of this spending comes from out-of-pocket
expenditures by the households.  Most of this spending is on primary care, and within primary
care, on curative care; household spending comprises 92 percent of primary curative care
(Berman, 1998).  Despite a large and extensive public health care system, even low income
rural communities have a wide choice of non-government health care providers, and there is
indirect evidence that they often prefer local fee-based private facilities to government funded
ones, quality and accessibility being prominent among the reasons for this choice. There has
been substantial analysis on the quality of the public health care service: the consensus is that this
is not as inexpensive as it seems, is often not of the best quality (Dreze and Sen, 1995; World
Bank, 1995a) and is also inaccessible.  The private sector on the other hand is much more
expensive, but easily accessible.  The quality of medical services in the private sector is uneven,
and there are issues of monitoring that are now being discussed with respect to the private
sector.  But the easy accessibility and the asymmetry of information regarding quality has17
resulted in a situation where the private sector is still accessed more than the government sector
as far as curative primary health care is concerned.  This has been confirmed by recent analysis
of the National Sample Survey data (Berman, 1998), and reinforces the impression that private
provision is highly significant, even for health problems, which have been the major focus of
government interventions.
In the absence of major changes in the revenue-raising powers of the states, the health
financing problems of the country are unlikely to change in the near future.  Cost recovery, as a
means of supplementing budget allocations for the health sector may be a necessity rather than
an option.  Cost recovery varies among states, but generally it is considered low; a study
indicated that the average cost recovery for 15 major states was about 3.8 percent over the
period 1975-76 and 1988-89 (World Bank, 1997).  The low level of cost recovery in India
implies that state governments will continue to depend on the government budget for most of
their resources.  Also, a large part of government funds are for non-plan expenditures and
directed to salaries, with very little left to spend on investment and other non-salary
expenditures.  This in turn results in operational deficiencies, including under-funding of drugs,
supplies, equipment, and a general deterioration of infrastructure.
User charges should generally follow the ability-to-pay principle and protect the poorer
sections of the society.   These fees should take into account externalities and should be a signal
for allocative efficiency.  In India, fees are not used as a pricing mechanism that should improve
allocative efficiency.  Not only are the fees charged to outpatients and inpatients at various
health facilities below the private sector rates, they are often less than the marginal cost of
providing these services.  The government does not charge for services at the primary level, i.e.
at sub-centres, primary health centres, and community health centres serving up to 100,000
people.   Fees are only charged at the level of community hospitals and above, including
secondary and tertiary hospitals.   However, the poor are exempted from most of the fees for
hospital services.  It is also argued that the government mechanism for collecting fees is very
weak, and often there are leakages, with the poor paying and the non-poor benefiting from the
exemptions.
There are studies that show that the low level of user fee in government facilities do not
fully reflect the actual expenditure per illness episode paid by the patient (World Bank, 1997).18
There are hidden charges like transportation, medicines, tests, diets and even bribes.
Individuals incur considerable out-of-pocket expenses beyond the official fees charged in any
case.  The burden of these costs must necessarily fall more on the poorer sections of the
society.
Careful thought needs to be given therefore to the issue of user charges: can the charges
be non-zero for some facilities? What kind of services should these be?  How can quality be
improved for services that have user fees? What are the elasticities of demand and within what
range can user fees be fixed?  Do these elasticities differ by income categories?  Many of these
questions can only be answered by careful analysis of household level data.  This study attempts
to answer some of these questions; specifically, by taking into account some of the major
factors that affect demand for health care services, the study estimates price elasticities to see
how sensitive the demand is to price variation.  The next section discusses the data used for this
study in detail.
3.2 Data: Issues and Limitations
The discussion above indicates that an ideal system of estimation of demand for health care
should include demographic variables (e.g., family size, gender, age, education), facility
characteristics that indicate quality (e.g., size, staffing, availability in terms of regularity and
distance to be travelled), and crucial economic variables such as prices, income or asset
ownership, consumption by the individual, work days affected by illness, and time or travel
costs.  With these variables, one can then use the nested multinomial logit specification, where
the individual first decides whether to seek care or not, and then conditional on seeking care
decides from which provider to seek care. The model is particularly suitable when sick
individuals face a wide variety of choice of health care facilities, including both government
provided health centres (hospitals, dispensaries, primary health centres, etc.) and private
physicians (both registered and unregistered) and clinics.  These demand equations can be used
to calculate price elasticities that show how price sensitive consumers are and how price
sensitivity differs among consumer groups.
The NCAER/Human Development Indicator Survey (HDIS) 1994-95 has extensive
all-India level data on a variety of indicators that indicate vulnerability.  The household data set19
is supplemented with a village-level data set where detailed information on the village
characteristics has been collected.   Henceforth we will refer to both data sets as HDIS data.
While the required variables can be categorised in several ways, a good starting point
would be the requirements of the NMNL itself. The NMNL functions on the principle that an
individual chooses among several alternatives of health care available to him. A complete set of
data for estimation purposes would therefore provide us with three kinds of information. The
first set would be specific to the individual, irrespective of the option selected. This data would
enumerate all the socio-economic characteristics associated with the individual concerned. The
second type of data relates to the choice, which has actually been exercised by the individual
concerned, including the no-care/self-care option. The third set of data would provide us with
the details of the options, which were faced but not exercised by the individual.  The first two
kinds of information can be obtained from the household data and the third set of variables from
the village data. Since the availability of correct information is the key to a good analysis, it is
important to point out the data-related issues, and indicate the limitations this imposed on the
analysis.
Section 7 of the household questionnaire contains data on variables relating to both
long-term and short-term morbidity. Based on the health profile module of the household
questionnaire, the first step was to construct sub-files containing data which would be amenable
to our analysis.  Using data for the age group 15-60 (adults), the data was sorted by using two
basic filters -- by morbidity (long and short duration); and by inpatients/outpatients.  Finally,
short-duration morbidity (outpatient) was classified according to the three illness groups
reported in the dataset -- fever, cold and cough, diarrhoea.
The price variable used is called “fees” in the household questionnaire; though the
questionnaire asked the respondents to list “two provider options” which he/she accessed for
treatment, unfortunately the follow-up questions on the fees and expenses incurred on the illness
do not clarify which provider these should be attributed to in cases where more than one
provider has been accessed.  Also, it is not clear whether the fee variable reports fees for one
or more visits to the concerned provider. In the absence of such details, we have assumed that
the fee relates to a single visit, for the first provider accessed by the individual.20
In the second step, the provider options reported in the village data set had to be
matched with the providers mentioned by the households.  The household questionnaire listed
12 treatment/provider options for health care, namely:
•  Indigenous practitioner
•  Faith healer/religious person
•  PHC/CHC/Sub-centre
•  Government hospital
•  Private consultations with government doctor
•  Private hospital/Nursing home
•  Private doctor – qualified
•  Private doctor – unqualified
•  Paramedical staff
•  Village health workers
•  Pharmacists/Medical shop
•  Any other (to be specified by respondent)
  Ideally, a one-to-one match between the providers in both the data sets is an essential
for analytical purposes, because facility-level characteristics should be used for quality
variables, and also for imputing fees, as discussed later.  However, the village data set has a list
of providers that look quite different from the household data set.  These are:
•  Hospital
•  Dispensary with trained doctors




•  Maternity and Child Welfare Centre21
•  Family Welfare Centre
•  Trained Dai
•  Village health worker
•  Pharmacy
  Apart from the list of providers being different in parts, the other major problem is that
while the type of ownership (private or public) can be gleaned from the initial questions in the
village questionnaire, the subsequent questions cease to separate the private from the public
facilities.  In other words, questions on how frequently the facility is open and the distance of
these facilities from the village do not specify the ownership of the facility, making it very difficult
to separate the characteristics of public facilities from private ones, especially for villages that
have reported both kinds of facilities.
1 The question on staffing pattern is again sketchy, and
asked only for facilities that are supposed to be within the village.  A major omission in the list of
facilities in the village questionnaire related to the traditional/faith healer/indigenous practitioner,
which are reported in the household questionnaire and are quite ubiquitous.
  Interacting the provider options with the provider who was actually selected / accessed
by the individual, creates two groups:
  1.  Providers who were part of the individual choice set and were not selected.
  2.  Providers who were part of the individual’s choice set and were accessed for treatment by
the individual.
  The model under discussion would require to take into account both these cases. The
household data provides information relating to the second type of provider. However, for the
first set of providers, one is forced to look at the village data in order to identify the health
facilities that were available to an individual from a particular village. Further, on bringing
together these two data, a third category of providers also surfaces -- where an individual has
accessed a particular provider, with no corresponding facility being enumerated for that village
in the village level data.  This is clearly an error in the data set, which has to be taken care of by
                                                                
 
1 For instance there are 36 villages reporting both private and government dispensaries with trained doctors,
11 villages reporting government and private hospitals, 21 reporting dispensaries with untrained doctors in
both the sectors.22
making certain assumptions.  We assumed that if a respondent states that he/she accessed a
facility, then it exists in the village. (For our analysis, we thus needed to impute fees for
providers who were in the village, although they were not chosen by the individual, since the
individual was faced with some price schedule of fees for these providers.) Further, for the three
provider categories (indigenous, faith healer and others) that were not mentioned in the village
data at all, we had to assume that they were present in every village.  This is a safe assumption
especially for the first two categories.
  As mentioned above, fees needed to be imputed wherever a facility exists in a village,
but has not been accessed by any individual from the household dataset.  This list of
villages/facilities also includes all those who selected the “no care” option in the household
dataset.  This exercise had to be done to build up the complete choice set available to the
respondents.
  There are essentially two approaches by which fees can be imputed to a facility. One
approach is to use median pricing, say at the district level. The alternative approach would be to
econometrically predict fees based on a regression technique. One such econometric
methodology suggested in the literature is that of hedonic pricing, using the facility-level
characteristics as explanatory variables. While theoretically, hedonic pricing is the more sound
technique for imputing fees, the data limitations mentioned above, especially the lack of facility-
level variables that capture quality of facilities, meant that median pricing techniques had to be
used. Median fees were calculated after pooling together data on all the three outpatient
illnesses. For every state, the fee for a particular provider was imputed by taking the median
value of the fees actually reported by all the individuals who had accessed this particular
provider type for treatment of their illnesses. This median fee was imputed for each individual
who had faced this particular provider type, but had not actually accessed the provider for
treatment. Thus, we were able to assign a fee for each and every provider that an individual had
the option of choosing but did not access; while the fee reported by the individual was used for
the provider who had been actually accessed from among the choices that the individual had
faced. This exercise was carried out for all the illness types and each state in the dataset.23
  A similar scarcity of data also extends to the other most important variable that
determines choice of provider – distance to the facility.  It is now a standard practice to include
the time taken to travel to the facility as an explanatory variable. Together with an estimate of
the opportunity costs of an individual’s time, this is sometimes sufficient to identify the
parameters of the demand function, when the price variable is zero in most cases, as is the case
with government facilities in less developing countries. The HDIS data reports transport costs
rather than travel time; this meant that we could not use the opportunity cost of time as an
additional measure of the price of care.  It is also not clear which mode of transport had been
used to arrive at this cost figure.  Nevertheless, we have used the reported transport cost to
arrive at net consumption in order to be consistent with the theory of utility maximisation.
  Finally, from a choice set of 12 providers, we have arrived at a 5-provider data set, by
clubbing together similar facility types. In moving from 13-provider options, including a no-
care/self-care option, to a smaller listing of providers, two primary considerations had to be
kept in mind; the desire to reach meaningful policy conclusions regarding the choice between
public, private and no care options, and the need to guard against the potential loss of individual
facility-level information, due to the clubbing of providers. The Hausman specification test
provides a scientific basis for clubbing alternative providers. After experimenting with alternative
groupings, we used the Chi square critical values at 95 per cent confidence intervals to define
the relevant alternatives. The final 5 categories used in the analysis are the following:
•  Traditional healers
•  Private qualified doctors
•  Government facility
•  Private unqualified doctors
•  No care
The first category of traditional healers includes indigenous practitioners, faith healers, religious
persons and the category originally classified as “any other” in the HDIS dataset. Private
qualified doctors consists of private consultations with government doctor, private hospital
/nursing home and private doctor qualified. While PHC/CHC/Sub-centre and government24
hospital constitute the category classified above as Government facility, private doctor –
unqualified and pharmacists have been clubbed together as private unqualified doctors. The no-
care alternative comprises of all those who were ill but did not seek care. Table 1 gives the
detailed illness-wise break-up regarding utilisation of each provider type.
Table 1: Providers accessed by illness types and by 5 facility types
 (figures in percentage)
Illness/Facility 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Diarrhoea 9.72 29.00 28.29 11.96 21.03 100
Cold & Cough 7.34 32.45 21.98 13.23 25.01 100
Fever 8.10 45.88 20.82 11.64 13.56 100
All Illnesses 7.91 35.22 22.74 12.63 21.50 100
         Note :Type of facility : 1 - Traditional, 2 - Private Qualified, 3 - Government, 4 - Private Unqualified, 5 –
No care.  Source: NCAER 1995 Household Survey Data.
  Table 1 clearly brings out that a substantial number of those ill do not seek any health
care at all. Thus, while modelling the demand for health care in India, along with public and
private provision of health care, the alternative of not seeking care has to be given an important
place
2.
                                                                
2 The last category of “no care” subsumes under it all those who resorted to home remedies. This is a
relatively safe assumption to make since, in terms of our estimation exercise, those who had taken some
home based remedial measures do not provide any additional information regarding the fee structures or
options for treatment that they faced as distinct from those who did not undertake any such home treatment
measures. The proportion of those taking home treatment within this category of no care, varied from 64 per
cent in the case of diarrhoea to 35 per cent in the case of fever.25
4.  ANALYSIS OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE
4.1 Model for demand for health care
The basic premise on which this analysis is based is derived from the standard behavioural
model in which utility depends on health and consumption of other goods besides health care
(Gertler and van der Gaag, 1990).
The conditional utility function is given by
Uj  =  a0 Hj   +  a1 Cj  +  a2 Cj
2  +  uj                                                                .... (1)
where Hj is expected health status after receiving treatment from provider j, Cj is income net of
price paid to provider (Pj) and transport costs, which is distance travelled T j times the
opportunity cost of time w (i.e. Cj = Y – Pj – wTj).  The error term u j is distributed with a zero
mean and a finite variance.
Let the health care production function be defined as H j=Qj + H 0, where Q j is the
quality of provider j’s care and H0 is health status without care.
Substituting the production function in equation (1) gives the conditional utility function
as,
Uj  =  a0 H0  +  a0 Qj  +  a1 ( Y- Pj - wTj )  +  a2 (Y- Pj - wTj)
2  + uj                .…(2)
The identification of the parameters in (2) requires that the values of expected health and
consumption differ across alternatives. The alternative that the household chooses is the one that
yields the highest utility. In a linear specification, the contribution of income to utility would
reduce to a1Y, which is constant across alternatives, and therefore cannot influence which
alternative is chosen. The quadratic consumption term includes a price-income interaction
whose value is not constant across alternatives, and therefore allows price effects to vary by
income.
Quality (Qj) cannot be observed directly and therefore needs to be specified as a
function of observables. The expected quality of provider j’s care is the expected improvement
in health over the health status with no care.26
This expected improvement in health could be thought of as a health production
function, which includes characteristics of the provider as well as characteristics  of  the
individual, including his/her health status. In general, the value of health may vary with variables
like age, gender, education, severity of illness etc. A reduced form model of utility from quality is
        a0 Qj =  b0j  +  b1j X  +  hj                                                                                                             ….(3)
where X is a vector of demographic variables. The coefficients in (3) can vary by alternatives, to
make the specification general.
Substituting (3) into (1) and ignoring a0H0, we get
Uj  =  Vj  +  uj  +  hj                                                                                            ....(4)
where,
Vj   =  b0j  +  b1jX  +  a1(Y - Pj - wTj)  +  a2(Y - Pj - wTj)
2
The intercepts and coefficients on the demographic variables vary by alternative, but the
coefficients on the economic variables are constant across alternatives.
Finally, the specification of the stochastic distribution enables estimation of the demand
function. The demand function for a provider is the probability that the utility from the alternative
is higher than the utility from any other alternative.  Thus the indirect conditional utility function
derived from the behavioural model is the basis of deriving the demand function.
The demand function can take on a multinomial logit (MNL) form or a nested
multinomial logit (NMNL) form. The MNL suffers from the assumption of the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives, which assumes that the stochastic portions of the conditional utility
function are uncorrelated among alternatives. The NMNL allows for correlation across sub-
groups of alternatives and therefore, non-constant price elasticities across sub-groups.
In our analysis we use the Nested Multinomial Logit Model (NMNL) which does not
suffer from the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The NMNL also
provides a summary way (McFadden 1981) of testing whether the grouping or nesting used is
valid.  McFadden shows that the inclusive value parameter for different branches should lie
between 0 and 1 for the model to be consistent with utility maximisation.
In our specification, we use a two-level decision tree: the individual chooses between
formal and informal care. Let m = 1,2,3,.....M index a branch of a choice model. Let n =27
1,2,3,.....N index the sub-choices of that branch. In the present analysis,  m = formal and
informal and
k = private qualified, private unqualified, government when n = formal and,
k = traditional/faith healer, no care when  n = informal.
An inclusive value parameter (Dm) is a dissimilarity parameter, which summarises the
observed information of a particular branch:
    Nj
Dm  =  ln S  exp (Vmn)
   n=1
where, V is the indirect utility function.
Choice probabilities can then be written as
Pmn =  Pn|m Pm    where
Pn|m =  exp (Vmn) / exp (Dm)
    M
Pm = exp [ Vm  + (1 - s m) Dm]  / S  exp [Vt + (1- st) Dt ]
   t=1
The parameter sm on the inclusive value is the correlation between the unobservables of
the choices within a sub-group.
4.2 Estimation procedure
The usefulness of the NMNL model in the present context has already been explained in
Section 2.1. To reiterate, the NMNL is a special case of the MNL, which  enables analysis of a
single decision among two or more alternatives. More specifically, it relaxes the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, which arises as a consequence of the initial MNL
assumption that the stochastic terms in the utility function are independent. The model was
estimated using LIMDEP (Version 7.0), which uses the full information maximum likelihood
estimator technique for a nested logit specification.
Unlike earlier models, we put no care and traditional care (indigenous and faith healer) together,
and call this category informal care.  Home treatment is also subsumed under this category.28
Under formal care, we include government facilities, private unqualified and private qualified
doctors.  The data is pooled over three diseases, diarrhoea, cold and cough and fever, and
restricts the sample to only outpatient care, so that the sample is homogeneous. The health care
provider choice being estimated in this paper can be depicted graphically as follows:
Fig. 1: Health care provider choice in Rural India
Patient
Formal Care           Informal Care
                         Govt.        Pvt.        Pvt.            Traditional    No-care
         Qualified   Unqualified
It is important to see what percentage of individuals accessed a particular choice, and
faced non-zero prices.  This is given in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Type of care sought with magnitude of non-zero prices
Type of provider % seeking care % facing non-zero prices
Traditional & faith healers 7.91 36
Private qualified 35.22 64
Government 22.74 24
Private unqualified 12.63 35
No care 21.50 0
Source: NCAER 1995 household survey data.29
As Table 2 indicates, the data reveals a very low level of provider choice in general; almost  22
percent of the respondents did not seek any care (the option “no care” includes home care).
The most accessed provider was the category of private qualified doctors This was followed by
the government providers, and then private unqualified providers.  Further, if one looks at the
percentage of people who paid non-zero fees, only 24 percent paid any fees in the government
sector.  Oddly, there were a large number of people who said they paid non-zero fees at the
other provider facilities also.  It is not clear why 36 percent of the individuals did not pay any
fees when they visited a private qualified provider.
To estimate price elasticities of provider choice, and to estimate the effects of user fees,
one needs the “fee” variable to be a clean price variable.  However, there has been some
concern that the fee variable may sometimes include the costs of medicines and drugs, in which
case it is not a clean variable.   However, the NCAER data set does in fact ask separately
about expenditures on drugs and medicines, apart from fees.  We therefore, assume, that by
and large, the fee variable is in fact what it says it is: fee for consultation.  The other concern has
been that even if "fee" is really the price of consultation, should one not include the price of
medicines, to arrive at a better "price" of facility variable? This concern is real if one is analysing
the health expenditure patterns of individuals.  However, this particular exercise is only to
estimate the price elasticities of consultation, which excludes all other costs of treatment.  To
that extent, including costs of drugs would introduce bias in the estimates, and one would be
unable to calculate a clean price elasticity of demand.  Also, including the costs of medicines
would make the final variable different from what one understands as user fee in a health facility
set up.  For all these reasons, we continue to use the fee for consultation as the variable of
interest in this exercise.  As will be seen below, these features had to be explicitly dealt with
during the estimation procedure.
Ideally, for estimating provider choice models, facility level variables which capture the
qualitative aspects of facilities (e.g. waiting time, staffing patterns, etc.) play an important role as
explanatory variables. However, as pointed out earlier we have faced severe data limitations
with regard to this aspect of the data set. The only variable we could use was the variable on30
whether or not the facility was open regularly.  Table 3 below presents summary statistics
relating to the variables that were used for estimating the model.
3
                                                                
3 Further details relating to the dataset are provided in the appendix. These tables include information on the
percentage of people accessing a facility type, the average transport costs and fees faced by the
respondents, the frequency with which a particular facility type remains open and the age and gender
distribution of the sample respondents.31
Table 3: Summary Statistics on explanatory variables
used in the estimation
Variable Mean value
 Monthly household income (rupees) 2510.71
Gender (1 if female)     0.53
Education (1if >=primary schooling) 0.34
Age (years) 35.65
Fees (rupees per visit) 14.19
Transport costs(rupees per visit) 10.71
Consumption (rupees) 2490.98
Notes: Number of observations used in the estimation was 10996. The consumption term is defined
as income net of medical costs i.e. income less transport costs less fees. The mean values for
transport costs and fees are based on only those who actually sought care as distinct from the no
care category.
The socio-economic variables used were per capita income of the individual; gender,
age, and the educational level reported by the individual. The facility-specific variables, which
were used in the estimation exercise, are fees, frequency with which the facility was open, and,
the transport costs faced by each individual. The income variable  gives the monthly household
income associated with a particular individual in the data.  The variable on gender is a
categorical variable, which takes a value of 1 if the individual is a female and 0 in case he/she is
a male. Similarly, the variable education takes a value of 1 for all those who have an educational
attainment of at least having completed primary schooling. For those who are below this level of
education, the variable takes a value of zero. Transport and fee record the actual transport costs
and fees faced by the individual. Age is a continuous variable, and the variable on the frequency
with which facility is open (not reported in Table 3) takes on a value of 1 if it is open regularly.
Transport costs and fees have been netted out from income to arrive at net consumption.
Two alternative NMNL specifications were tried: one where fee is entered separately
from income, and one where a consumption term is used net of medical costs.  We also tried a32
MNL specification with net consumption as one of the right hand side variables.  Finally, a
MNL with only those who sought care was tested to see if the results improved.  The only two
models that yielded the right signs for the consumption term is the nested multinomial logit as
well as the nn-nested MNL on the full model.  The signs on the consumption and consumption
square terms in all the other specifications were inconsistent with health being a normal good
(the results from NMNL and MNL did not differ significantly).  We present below the results
from the NMNL model.
4.3 Results
Table 4 below presents the results from the NMNL specification with a net consumption term.
While it is difficult to interpret these coefficients meaningfully without first converting
these into marginal effects, the signs and significance of the coefficients would reveal whether or
not the model is able to explain the factors affecting provider choice.  It should be noted here
that the omitted category is the no care category.
The inclusive value parameters for both the branches were significant; though the values
were close to one, as mentioned above, the model reported here is still the
Table 4: Results from NMNL Estimation
Variable Coefficient t-statistics
Consumption .47E-04 3.30*









Frequency with which facility open_1 -0.85 -9.37*
Frequency with which facility open_2 -2.05 -22.13*
Frequency with which facility open_3 -1.48 -20.35*33













Notes: The _affixed to a variable denotes the choice it relates to. T-ratios for the concerned variable are
reported in parenthesis beneath the coefficient values. * - denotes a 5% level of significance. A choice
specific intercept term was also used in the estimation exercise. The intercept term was positive and
significant for choices 3 and 4.
best specification among all the various groupings of providers as well as nesting alternatives that
were tried.
The results from the NMNL model show that the net consumption variable is significant
with a positive sign, with the square term being negative.  This indicates that  both income and
price affect the choice of provider, and that there is diminishing marginal utility of consumption.
Without further analysis however, it is not possible at this instance to say more about the
individual effects of these two variables.
Age is positive and significant in all of the provider choices  indicating  that adults
increase utilisation  of medical care as they grow older.   Education is again positive  and
significant for all the four providers, indicating that it is an important determinant of provider
choice, and that individuals with less education are likely to demand more care, compared to
those with more education.  This of course could be driven by the fact that there is a high
correlation between morbidity rates and low education.
The sign on the gender variable indicates that females are in general more prone to seek
health care than male, except in the government sector.
4   Interestingly, demand for all types of
                                                                
4 The data revealed that the proportion of females accessing a particular provider is higher for all the
provider types, except the government provider.34
providers decrease if the facility to be accessed is not open on a regular basis. This illustrates
the importance attached to the quality aspect while choosing a particular facility.
Since price and income are specified in a non-linear manner in the model, it is difficult to
assess their effect on demand directly from these results. Following the methodology of Gertler
and Van  der Gaag (1990), we estimate arc price elasticities for only two of the provider
choices, government and private qualified, by income quartiles.  This is done by first calculating
the probability of an individual choosing an alternative at the bottom and top of the selected
price range, for each individual.  For all other variables except the price, the average value of
the variable in that income quartile is taken for estimation.  The arc price elasticity is then
calculated by dividing the average percentage change in the sum of the probabilities by the
percentage change in price.  This is done for each of the four quartiles. These results are
presented in Table 5 below for the government sector and the private qualified sector.  Graphs
1 and 2 map the elasticity values for these two sectors, for each income quartile.
Table 5:  Arc price elasticities in a five choice framework (NMNL model)
A.  Government Sector
Fee range Income quartiles
I II III IV
1 – 20 0.00005 0.00005 0.000047 0.000034
21 – 50 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.00071
51 – 100 0.0025 0.0026 0.0024 0.0017
101 – 200 0.0049 0.0051 0.0048 0.0034
201 – 500 0.010 0.010 0.0096 0.0069
501-1000 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.018
B.  Private Qualified Sector
Fee range Income quartiles
I II III IV
1 – 20 0.000022 0.000022 0.000020 0.000015
21 – 50 0.00047 0.00047 0.00042 0.00031
51 – 100 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.00076
101 – 200 0.0023 0.0023 0.0020 0.0015
201 – 500 0.0046 0.0046 0.0041 0.0031
501-1000 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.007835
       Note: All elasticity entries carry a negative sign.
Note that the last two rows in the table indicate price ranges that are outside the range reported
in the data  –  the elasticities thus indicate a possible simulated scenario of  price change. All the
elasticities show the right sign indicating a negatively sloped demand curve.  Each column shows
the price elasticity holding income constant.  Each row indicates the change in price elasticity as
income rises, holding price constant.
The most striking result revealed by Table 5 is that the price elasticities are very small in
magnitude.  For instance, between the fee range of Rupees 1-20, the elasticity is 0.00005 only,
which is close to zero.  However, as one moves up the price range, holding income constant,
the elasticity goes up significantly.  This implies that individuals are more sensitive to higher
prices than lower prices, which is a very sensible result.  But despite that, if there is a 10 percent
increase in prices in the government sector (in the price range between Rs. 500 and 1000) there
will be a decrease in demand of only about 0.03 percent.
Within a price range, the price elasticity of demand decreases marginally with increases
in income, though the magnitudes are small.  This indicates that the poor are somewhat more
price sensitive than the rich, and therefore user fees will tend to reduce utilisation by the poor
more, compared to the rich.
If one looks at the private qualified providers, the values are even smaller, though the
signs and the direction of change seem to be again logical.  The lower values indicate that
demand for private providers is more inelastic than that for government providers.  Here the
quality variables must surely play a role; because private providers are accessed more
frequently than government providers in India, and in general seem to be preferred to
government providers, a small change in price in this sector is unlikely to bring in a large change
in demand.   In fact, it must be mentioned here, that in the absence of good quality variables,
these elasticities are probably underestimates, though this has been to some extent controlled by
introducing choice-specific dummies in the estimation.  The estimates from the MNL in fact
show even lower elasticities.3637


















































5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Human Development Index Data collected by the National Council of Applied Economic
Research was used to explore the possible effects of an increase in user fees on demand for
providers.  This is especially relevant for the cash-strapped government facilities in India.  Many
studies have indicated that demand for government facilities is low as compared to private
providers because of quality and access problems.  That this is true is borne out by the HDIS
data too.  Only 23 percent of the respondents visited a government provider, while slightly more
than 35 percent of the respondents visited a private qualified provider.  If we consider all private
providers this figure goes up to 56 percent.  At the same time, low or no user fees makes the
situation worse in terms of both efficiency and equity (since it is not clear whether the benefits
are really going to those who need it most), as well as from the revenue point of view.
The question that needs to be addressed is whether or not imposing or raising user fees
will lead to a decline in demand.  It has been argued that appropriate user fees can benefit both
providers and clients by strengthening the referral system and providing better signals about
appropriate points of entry to the health system (World Bank, 1995b).  However, all these
benefits will be offset if user fees reduce demand for health care for those facilities where user
fees have been levied.  This can only be gleaned from a study on demand for health care.  This
has never been done in the case of India, and this study is an attempt to fill this gap.
However, the analysis was severely restricted by the available data; to do justice to
such a study, it is extremely important that data on the quality of providers and the facility are
available.  The HDIS data on health facilities was severely limited in its scope, making it very
difficult to estimate a demand system where one could control for quality.
Nevertheless, an attempt to estimate such a system of equations using both nested and
non-nested multinomial logit was made, and arc price elasticities were calculated.  With better
quality variables, these elasticities would probably improve in magnitude and be more realistic,
since it would give the net effect of price as well as quality.  Introducing  provider-specific
dummies allowed us to control this problem somewhat.39
The very low magnitudes of these elasticities indicate that there may be some scope to
levy user fees in the government facilities.  In fact, the differences across income classes were
very minor in terms of changes in demand.  The elasticities were more inelastic for private
qualified providers, indicating that if the private sector were to raise its prices, there will still not
be much effect on demand. The question remains that if quality of government facilities is so low,
why is demand inelastic at higher ranges of prices.  The answer could lie in a segmented market;
with those who are willing and able to pay more accessing the private sector, and those who
may be willing but not able to pay more accessing the government sector.  It also must be
remembered that the analysis is being done for rural India, where consumers probably face
much fewer choices.  The fact that a higher price is not bringing forth a great reduction in
demand could be just because there is not much else to choose from.  In any case, the analysis
does reveal that the elasticities are moving in the right direction - at higher price ranges, the arc
price elasticities are higher.
In sum, the tentative conclusion from this analysis seems to be that there may be some
scope to increase price from zero or almost zero levels to a level that will not result in reduced
demand.  For example, if price is increased from 0 to Rs. 50, it may not affect demand; at
higher prices, a small reduction in demand is likely.  Given that most of those who accessed a
government provider did not pay any price indicates that a low level of user fee can safely be
levied.  However, it must be remembered that this has to be accompanied by quality
improvements and a good referral system.   In rural India, where individuals may not have a
wide range of choice, a higher price may not reduce demand because of the limited options; this
may not be a good option especially since it will hurt the budget of poorer households.  But an
increase in price accompanied by improvement in quality may in fact bring forth an increase in
demand.
Finally, this analysis reveals that the need for high quality data is a necessity for
policymakers if they have to understand the intricacies of demand for health care.  Facility level
data that measures quality of providers must be linked up with household level variables.  These
can then be used to measure effects of price changes on demand for health care more minutely,
and can be a very useful tool for policy guidance on health financing issues.40
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Table A.1: Sample Characteristics for the age group
15 to 60 years (both inclusive)
Characteristics Number of Observations Percent to total
Age group: 15-20 23835 21
Age group: 21-30 35053 31
Age group: 31-40 24190 22
Age group: 41-50 15457 14
Age group: 51-60 13507 12
Sex : Male 58209 52
Sex : Female 53833 48
Reported ill 11032 10
Reported not ill 101010 90
All 112042 100
Table A.2: Frequency with which each facility remains open (in %age)
Type of Facility Daily Occasionally Rarely Total
3 77 17 7 100
4 94 3 3 100
5 82 16 2 100
6 94 3 3 100
7 82 16 2 100
8 78 11 11 100
9 73 18 10 100
10 61 24 15 100
11 94 5 1 100
Note: The above information on frequencies was generated from the village data after redefining
the facility types mentioned in the village to match those in the household questionnaire. The
facility types are: 3. PHC/CHC/Sub-Centre, 4. Government hospital, 5. Private consultations with
government doctor, 6. Private hospital, 7. Private doctor qualified, 8. Private doctor unqualified, 9.
paramedical staff, 10. Village health worker, 11. Pharmacist.
                                                                
5All the tables in this appendix have been generated by using the NCAER 1995 household survey data.43
Table A.3: Average fees charged by facility type.













Note: 1. Indigenous practitioner, 2. Faith healer/Religious person, 3. PHC/CHC/Sub-centre,
4.  Government hospital, 5. Private consultation with government doctor, 6. Private hospital,
7. Private doctor qualified, 8. Private doctor unqualified, 9. Paramedical staff, 10. Village health
worker, 11. Pharmacist, 12. Others.44



















Note: 1. Indigenous practitioner, 2. Faith healer/Religious person, 3. PHC/CHC/Sub-centre,
5.  Government hospital, 5. Private consultation with government doctor, 6. Private hospital,
7. Private doctor qualified., 8. Private doctor unqualified, 9. Paramedical staff, 10. Village health
worker, 11. Pharmacist, 12. Others.
Table A.5: Summary statistics by five facility types
Type of
facility*




Mean of reported fees,
including zero fees
1 7.91 19.33 7.00
2 35.22 33.84 21.85
3 22.74 29.73 7.22
4 12.63 27.98 9.91
5 21.50 - -
Note:   *Type of facility: 1. Traditional, 2. Private Qualified, 3. Government,
4. Private Unqualified,  5. No care45